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ABSTRACT 
The Internet Protocol (IP) has emerged as the dominant technology for 
determining how data is routed across the Internet. Because IP flows are defined 
essentially in terms of origin-destination (O-D) pairs, we represent IP traffic 
engineering as a multi-commodity flow problem in which each O-D pair is treated 
as a separate commodity. We account for the diversity in IP routing by modeling 
opposite extremes of traffic engineering: “naive” traffic engineering where the IP 
routes data between any two users using only the shortest path between them, 
and “best case” traffic engineering where IP has the flexibility to route data using 
multiple paths in the network regardless of their length. We develop linear 
programming formulations that identify the maximum data flow for an IP network 
that satisfies proportionality constraints for traffic demand for each case of traffic 
engineering, and we also determine the optimal interdiction of those flows that 
reduces that maximum flow in the worst possible way.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a quantitative means to assess 
the carrying capacity of an Internet Protocol (IP) based network under a general 
model for traffic demands, as well as identify the node and/or arc attacks that 
interrupt traffic flows in the worst possible manner. 
Over the last decade the Internet has become a critical infrastructure to 
our way of life. Internet Service Providers are the owners and operators of the 
computer networks that collectively afford the general public, schools, 
businesses, government, and military organizations, access to the Internet and 
its evolving applications. Network operators have developed explicit and implicit 
mechanisms for influencing the way in which IP traffic travels across their 
networks. This process is known as traffic engineering.  
We formulate a model representing “naive” traffic engineering where IP 
routes data for each origin-destination pair using only a single shortest path in 
the network. We desire to maximize this total amount of data flow by raising flow 
along every path in a proportional manner until one of the internal nodes and/or 
connecting arcs reaches capacity. Next we formulate a model representing  “best 
case” traffic engineering where IP has the flexibility to route data using multiple 
paths in the network regardless of length. We maximize the sum of the flows on 
artificial return arcs by increasing flow along all of them in proportion to each 
other until one of the arcs in the network reaches its capacity. 
ISPs are susceptible to many types of attacks, both physical and cyber, to 
their key components. The models developed here identity locations of attacks 
that have the most negative impact on the performance of the ISP. 
The analysis here focuses on Abilene, the high-speed backbone of the 
Internet2 educational network, a not-for-profit advanced networking consortium of 
universities, laboratories, and government agencies. We perform our analysis on 
a network representation of Abilene with node and/or arc capacities. We compute 
 xiv
the total amount of traffic routed between customers, the overall flow through the 
network, and the utilization of Abilene’s transshipment routers using both the 
naive and the best case traffic engineering formulations. We also identify the 
optimal node and arc attacks that affect the total amount of traffic routed between 
customers and the flow through the network in the worst possible way. We find 
that Abilene is well-provisioned in the sense that it tends to be the arcs, in 
particular the customer access links, that saturates data flow in the network, a 
generalization that is consistent with our results. 
The models and analysis in this thesis are applicable to any ISP network. 
The general public, businesses, civilian and military organizations rely heavily on 
these networks. As the reliance grows, so will the need for understanding an 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Over the last decade the Internet has become an infrastructure that is 
critical to supporting our way of life. People throughout the world rely on the 
Internet as a means for personal communication through the use of email, instant 
messaging, or chat rooms. Students have access to limitless amounts of 
information stored on the Internet on any topic imaginable. Co-workers are able 
to share information and conduct business in unprecedented manners. The Navy 
Marine Corps Intranet and the Army’s LandWarNet provide service members on 
all command levels with secure platforms for information sharing amongst 
military installations and forward-deployed forces throughout the world. 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are the owners and operators of the 
computer networks that collectively provide the general public, schools, 
businesses, government, and military organizations, access to the Internet and 
its evolving applications.  
The operation of the Internet is determined by protocols which specify the 
roles, rules, and responsibilities for individual technologies. Among these, the 
Internet Protocol (IP) has emerged as the dominant technology for determining 
how an ISP routes traffic across its part of the Internet from one customer to 
another.  
Network operators have developed explicit and implicit mechanisms for 
influencing the way in which IP traffic travels across their networks. This process, 
known as “traffic engineering,” allows the network operator to tune the 
performance of their network in response to changing traffic levels or 
environmental conditions. The two main protocols used to for traffic engineering 
of IP within a single ISP are Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) and Intermediate 
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System-Intermediate System (IS-IS), both of which compute shortest paths 
based on configurable link weights (see Rexford, 2006 and references therein). 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND MODELING APPROACH 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a quantitative means to assess 
the carrying capacity of an IP-based network under general traffic demands, and 
then to identify the node and/or arc attacks that interrupt traffic flows in the worst 
possible manner. Such tools will lead to a better understanding of the system-
wide vulnerabilities of real IP networks, as well as provide guidelines for network 
protection. We measure the performance of a given network in terms of the 
maximum traffic levels that it can support. We identify network vulnerabilities by 
determining the attack(s) to network components that reduce its maximum 
carrying capacity in the worst possible way.  
We  represent IP traffic flow using a  “gravity model” for traffic demand, 
which states that the amount of traffic exchanged between two users is 
proportional to the total amount of traffic entering and exiting each of those users 
(Alderson et al., 2006). Thus, the gravity model assumes that demand for traffic 
is proportional to the product of the “size” of the two users. In practice, the actual 
traffic levels (i.e., data flow between users) need not be proportional, even when 
the demands follow the gravity model. However, we assume that traffic levels 
occur in proportion to demand, which is an extreme type of “fairness” that we 
impose. The idea is to provide a share of network resources (e.g., transshipment 
router bandwidth throughput capacity) to each user based on their size. 
IP traffic engineering varies from ISP to ISP and depends on the 
technologies and polices in use. For example, it may be the intent of the ISP to 
minimize end-to-end traffic delay, or maximize utilization of network resources, or 
maximize “customer satisfaction.” Some ISP users may receive preferential 
access to network resources, with the other users sharing what remains. So we 
model two opposite extremes of traffic engineering alternatives. We first 
formulate a model representing “naive” traffic engineering where IP routes data 
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for each origin-destination pair using only a single shortest path in the network. 
This policy is easy to implement but tends to underutilize network resources. The 
second formulation represents “best case” traffic engineering where IP has the 
flexibility to route data using multiple paths in the network regardless of length. 
This policy yields a higher utilization of resources but is more complicated to 
implement and manage, and is an upper bound on achievable performance.  
We represent a particular ISP as a network by considering its router-level 
map. Nodes in the network correspond to routing devices, and arcs between 
routers correspond to direct connectivity as seen by IP. For simplicity, we 
assume that connections between nodes correspond to physical connectivity, 
although this may not be the case. We also consider the network capacities in 
the form of connection speeds for arcs, and router throughput bandwidth 
capacities (Alderson et al., 2005).  
We develop linear programming (LP) models that allow us to analyze the 
maximum carrying capacity of an ISP under a gravity model of user traffic 
demand. The models also examine the utilization of the ISP’s components (i.e., 
routers and their arcs), as well as identify the bandwidth limitations on those 
components. ISPs are susceptible to many types of attacks, both physical and 
cyber, to their key components (Doyle et al., 2005). The models developed here 
identify the attacks that have the biggest impact on the performance of the ISP. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK 
The study of network vulnerability problems is not new. For 
telecommunications, considerable effort has been directed at the analysis of the 
physical infrastructure, in particular the design of fiber optic networks 
(Henningsson et al., 2006). Grotschel et al. (1995) present a general framework 
for the design of “survivable” communication networks, including the study of 
minimum spanning trees, Steiner trees, and minimum cost k-connected network 
design problems.  An updated treatment of the problem can be found in Kerivin 
and Mahjoub (2005). 
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Much of the work in network vulnerability and survivability has its roots in 
graph theory, in which the network is represented solely in terms of its 
connections (without any annotations or domain-specific data), and considerable 
effort is devoted to assessing various measures of global connectivity. These 
include network diameter (i.e., average length of shortest path between any two 
nodes), characteristic path length (i.e., the average distance along any path 
between any two nodes), or the size and distribution of connected clusters. 
Recently, these graph theoretic measures have been applied to the Internet, and 
many studies have focused on how these connectivity patterns change in the 
presence of accidental or intentional graph losses (Albert et al., 2000, Cohen et 
al., 2000, Cohen at al., 2001, Bollobas and Riordan 2003, Crucitti et al., 2004). 
As discussed in Alderson (2008), a general problem with this approach is that 
any notion of network “function” is being approximated (often poorly) by these 
simple graph theoretic measures. 
The vulnerability of router-level Internet networks was discussed by Doyle 
et al. (2005), who showed that previous results by Albert et al. (2000), which 
focused on connectivity patterns and focused on critical high-degree hubs, were 
not relevant to the real Internet. In contrast, they considered the need to 
maximize flow on the part of the ISP and formulated a simple path-based model 
of network throughput, described here as the “single-path” model. However, their 
consideration of “worst case” attacks on network routers was myopic and 
heuristic, in that it simply ranked nodes in a prioritized list in terms of the effect 
their removal would have on overall network throughput.  They did not consider 
attacks that were formally optimal, nor did they consider more sophisticated 
models of traffic engineering that underlie real IP networks. 
Recent effort has been devoted to the application of optimal network 
interdiction to critical infrastructure protection (Brown at al., 2006). This thesis 
continues that effort and formalizes the notion of an optimal attack for a 
maximum proportional flow problem and provides analysis and computational 
implementation to solve it efficiently. 
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D. STRUCTURE OF THESIS AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The reminder of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter II we 
formulate two LP models, representing alternative approaches to traffic 
engineering discussed above. In Chapter III we use these models to perform a 
detailed analysis of Abilene, the backbone for the Internet2 academic network. 
Finally in Chapter IV we summarize the contributions of the thesis and offer 
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II. MODEL FORMULATION 
Because IP flows are defined essentially in terms of Source (node s) and 
Terminal (node t) node pairs, we represent IP traffic engineering as a multi-
commodity flow problem in which each s-t pair is treated as a separate 
commodity. In our network, the “edge” nodes (i.e., the nodes the provide network 
access to the users and connect to the internal nodes) represent the users. We 
will assume that all users communicate with one another, and that the demand 
for flow between user pairs is proportional to the product of their capacities, an 
assumption consistent with the aforementioned gravity model of traffic demand. 
The “internal” nodes (i.e., nodes that provide connectivity to the other network 
devices) represent intra-network routing devices (i.e., “routers”), and arcs 
connecting them represent one-hop IP connectivity between routers (i.e., routers 
directly “see” one another according to IP).  
The primary problem is to identify the maximum flow (and corresponding 
optimal routing) for a multi-commodity network that satisfies the proportionality 
constraints for flow demand as well as capacity constraints on nodes and arcs.   
The secondary problem is to identify the optimal interdiction of those flows 
that reduces that maximum flow in the worst possible way.  
We consider two approaches to traffic engineering. First, we consider a 
strict approach where each commodity follows a single shortest path. Second, 
we will look at best case traffic engineering in which it is possible to route traffic 
through the network by taking multiple, possibly longer, paths.  
A. SINGLE PATH MULTI-COMMODITY MAXIMUM FLOW  
1.  Solving for Maximum Flow 
This model represents the simplest form of traffic engineering. Traffic from 
user s to user t follows a single path in the network. That path is the computed 
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shortest path, in terms of the number of internal nodes visited (or arcs traversed), 
from user s, to user t. The total amount of data flow through the network is the 
sum of the traffic routed along all of the shortest s-t paths. There exist flow 
throughput capacities on the network’s “internal” nodes and/or the arcs 
connecting them. We desire to maximize this total amount of data flow by raising 
flow along every path in a proportional manner until one of the internal nodes 
and/or connecting arcs reaches capacity. We refer to the network components 
that reach capacity as "bottlenecks." 
Formulation 1: MAX SP (Maximizing Single-Path Flow) 
Index Use 
 , ,i j k N∈   Nodes  
( , )i j A∈   Directed arc from node i to node j  
 ,s t E N∈ ⊆          Source and terminal nodes in the set of “edge”   
                                            nodes  E  
Data 
 sD    Traffic demand by edge node s ∈ E [flow] 
 kB    Throughput capacity of node k∈N [flow] 
 ,i ju    Upper bound on flow from node i to node j       
                                 for each arc (i, j) ∈ A [flow] 
,s tr   Shortest path route from node s to node t for  







kr               Binary indicator whether node k is on the   
                                 shortest path from node s to node t for s, t ∈ E   
                                 [binary]           




1 if node k is on  









   ,,
s t
i jq    Binary indicator whether arc (i, j) is on the  
                                           shortest path from node s to node t  for s, t ∈ E    
                                           [binary] 




1 if arc( , ) is on 
0 if arc( , ) is not on 
s t
s t







,s tX      Flow along route ,s tr  from node s to node t  
                                 [flow]  
,s t


























s t s t
k k
s t E
s t s t





X r B k N
X q u i j A













(NOTE: Throughout the thesis, n denotes the number of nodes, e denotes the 
number of edge nodes, and m denotes the number of arcs.) 
Discussion 
Equation (C1.0) is the objective function which represents total amount of 
data flow through the network. It is the sum of the traffic routed along all of the 
shortest s-t paths. We maximize the objective function value by increasing the 
proportionality constant ρ. Equations (C1.1) and (C1.2) limit the amount of flow 
through each node and arc respectively. Equation (C1.3) ensures that flow is 
routed between each s-t pair, and that those flows are raised in proportion to 
each other. 
There is considerable preprocessing involved in solving for single-path 
maximum flow. We compute the ,s tr  values using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm 
(Appendix A). Floyd-Warshall determines the shortest paths between all node 
pairs, but we are only interested the shortest paths between each s-t node pair. 
Once the shortest path routes are determined, we use it to build a matrix      




⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (Appendix B)   
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and a matrix (size : e2 × m) of ,,
s t
i jq  values ,
,
( , )




⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (Appendix C).  
Each of the three tasks mentioned above runs in O(n3). 
Our formulation allows us to study networks in which only the nodes are  
capacitated ( kB < ∞ , ,i ju = ∞ ), or when just the arcs are capacitated ( kB = ∞ , 
,i ju < ∞ ), or when both nodes and arcs are capacitated ( kB < ∞ , ,i ju < ∞ ). 
The special structure associated with the constant of proportionality ρ 
affords a direct analytic solution to the maximum flow under single-path routing. 
For a network with capacitated nodes and un-capacitated arcs, consider 












X r B k N
X B B s t E Eρ
∈
≤ ∀ ∈
= ∀ ∈ ×
∑
 




s t k k
s t











ρ ≤ ∀ ∈∑  
Now we can solve for ρ directly. 
  ,
,






⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= > ∀ ∈⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
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For a network with capacitated arcs and un-capacitated nodes, we solve for ρ 
using equations (C1.2) and (C1.3) and performing the same substitution. Solving 
for ρ in this type of network yields the following result 
,
,
( , ) ,
,







⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= > ∀ ∈⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
 
For networks where both the nodes and arcs have capacity, the correct ρ is the 
minimum ρ between equations (1) and (2). This type of solution is easily 
implemented in a spreadsheet program such as EXCEL. 
2. Minimizing the Maximum Flow  
Suppose an opponent (an attacker) wants to incur the greatest amount of 
“damage” on the network. Assume that the attacker has the capability to destroy 
a limited number of nodes and/or arcs, thus reducing to zero the capacity for 
each of the destroyed nodes and/or arcs ( kB =0 and/or ,i ju =0). The attacker must 
decide which nodes and/or arcs in the network to destroy so that the maximum 
flow is minimized, perhaps to zero.  
The previous formulation is the same, with the addition of the following 
data and decision variables.  
Formulation 2: MIN-MAX SP (Minimizing the maximizing Single-Path 
Flow) 
Data 
attacks    Number of nodes and/or arcs that the attacker  






kY    Binary indicator for attacker destruction of node  
                                 k ∈ N [binary] 
   
1 if is destroyed
0 otherwisek
node k
Y ⎧=⎨⎩  
,i jY    Binary indicator for attacker destruction of    
                                 arc (i, j) ∈  A  [binary] 
   ,
1 if ( , ) is destroyed
0 otherwisei j
arc i j
Y ⎧=⎨⎩  











. . (1 ) (C2.1)
min
(1 ) ( , ) (C2.2)
(1 ) (1 ) , (C2.3)
s t
s t E




s t s t
i j i j i j
s t E
s t
s s t t
X
s t X r B Y k N
X q u Y i j A



















, 0,1 , ,
k i j
k N i j A




Y Y i j k N
∈ ∈
⎧ ⎫+ ≤⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪∈ϒ= ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪∈ ∀ ∈⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑ ∑





Equation (C2.0), the objective function, reflects that the attacker desires to 
minimize the previously maximized sum of traffic routed along all of the shortest 
s-t paths in the network. The attacker will seek to destroy nodes, or arcs, or both 
depending on the network’s structure (i.e., which components are capacitated). 
Equations (C2.1) and (C2.2) limit the amount of flow through each node and arc 
respectively. Equation (C2.3) ensures that flow is routed between each s-t pair, 
and that those flows are raised in proportion to each other. Equation (C2.4) 
places a limit of the number of attacks that the attacker can prosecute. 
Destroying a node or arc drops its capacity to zero. Equation (C2.5) states that 
destroying arc (i, j) also destroys arc (j, i). 
Solving by Total Enumeration 
There are a finite number of kY  and ,i jY  variables for the model. Thus, the 
optimal “interdiction” solution can be determined by checking all possible choices 
for kY  and ,i jY  for a given value of attacks , and then keeping the “best” solution 
(i.e., the solution that minimizes the maximum flow through the network the most, 
as in Rardin et al., 1998).  
This type of total enumeration works for problems with limited size. For the 
network operator (the defender), there are e(e-1) decision variables, one for each 
s-t pair. There are n+m decision variables for the attacker.  
Discussion 
When a node or arc is attacked, it is removed from the network. We then 
use the Floyd-Warshall algorithm to re-compute the shortest paths for the 




i jq  values can be can calculated.  




i jq  values directly impacts flow through the 
network, as measured by ρ. In some instances ρ will decease, as expected. 
However, in other instances ρ may actually increase. This is the converse of 
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Braess’s paradox, which states that adding additional capacity to a network can 
reduce the network’s total flow  (see Florian and Hearn 1995). In our case it is 
possible that, by attacking certain nodes or arcs, bottlenecks are removed from 
the network resulting in a net increase in flow through the remaining network.  
B.   MULTIPLE PATH MULTI-COMMODITY MAXIMUM FLOW MODEL 
1.  Solving for the Maximum Flow 
This model represents best-case traffic engineering in that the network is 
able to route traffic along multiple, possibly longer, paths, and makes better 
overall use of network resources. Here, we modify the standard LP formulation of 
the Maximum s-t Flow problem (Appendix D) to accommodate multi-commodity 
flows while also adding a proportionality constraint for each s-t pair. We use the 
technique of “node splitting” to replace the capacity of a node with a capacitated 
arc connecting the two split nodes. In this manner, all capacities are represented 
as arc capacities.  Like the single-path model, the goal is to maximize that total 
amount of data flow through the network. We introduce an artificial return arc for 
every s-t pair. The return arcs are unbounded ( ,s tu = ∞ ), but must adhere to the 
constant of proportionality. We maximize the sum of the flows on the return arcs, 
again, by increasing flow along all of them in proportion to each other until one of 
the arcs in the network reaches its capacity.  
Formulation 3: MAX MP (Maximizing Multiple-Path Flow) 
  Index Use  
 , ,i j k N∈   Nodes  
( , )i j A∈   Directed arc from node i to node j 
,s t E N∈ ⊆       Source and terminal nodes in the set of “edge”                    




 Each “internal” node k ∈  E is split into two nodes {k, k’} with     
 directed arc (k, k’) connecting them.  
k k k’
kB
, 'k k ku B=
 
Data 
kB    Throughput capacity at node k ∈  N  [flow] 
sD    Demand for edge node s ∈ E  [flow] 
 
 ,i ju    Upper bound on flow from node i to node j   
                                  on arc (i, j) ∈ A [flow] 












i jX             “Internal” flow of commodity s-t on arc (i, j) ∈ A [flow] 
 ,s tZ   “Return” flow of commodity s-t on artificial arc  
                                 (t ,s)∈A [flow] 
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Discussion 
Equation (C3.0), the objective function, represents the sum of the flows 
along the return arcs (t, s). We maximize the objective function value by 
increasing the proportionality constant ρ. Equation (C3.2) is a balance of flow 
constraint. Equation (C3.2) limits the amount of flow on each arc. Equation (C3.4) 
ensures that flow is routed along each return arc (t, s), and that those flows are 
raised in proportion to each other. 
The following table shows the number of decision variables and 
constraints contained in multiple-path model: 
  Decision Variables   Constraints     
 Flow from s to t e·(e-1) Flow Balance n·e·(e-1)  
 Arc Flow m·e·(e-1) Arc Capacity m  
      Demand e·(e-1)   
 
The multiple-path model is a linear programming formulation that we solve 
using General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software and the Solver 
CPLEX.  The effort GAMS requires to solve the multiple-path model grows 
significantly with the number of s-t pairs, e(e-1), in a given network. 
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2. Minimizing the Maximum Flow 
Consider again the case of an attacker who can disable a finite number of 
network components and seeks to damage the total network flow in the worst 
possible manner. A natural choice to represent the effect of an arc attack is to set 
the capacity of the attacked arc to zero (as was done in the single-path model). 
However, an equivalent and computationally attractive approach is to assign a 
penalty cost, ,i jv , to attacked arcs. This discourages the defender from sending 
flow across an arc that’s been destroyed. To avoid attacked arcs, the penalty 
cost must be greater the one, because, if ,i jv =1 the defender is completely 
indifferent to sending flow across the interdicted arc, and the resulting problem 
may have many equivalent optimal solutions. Thus we set ,i jv =2 if arc (i, j) is 
susceptible to being attacked. We can similarly designate an arc as invulnerable 
by setting ,i jv =0. In this model, artificial return arcs are all invulnerable. 
The previous formulation is the same, with the addition of the following 
data and decision variables. 
Formulation 4: MIN-MAX MP (Minimizing the Maximizing Multiple-Path 
Flow) 
Data 
,i jv    Penalty cost for arc (i, j) ∈ A [cost/flow] 
attacks      Number of arcs the attacker can destroy  
                           [cardinality] 
Decision Variables 
( , )i jY    Attacker destruction of arc (i, j) ∈ A [binary] 
,
1 if ( , ) is destroyed
0 otherwisei j
arc i j
Y ⎧=⎨⎩  
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Min-Max optimization of flow[dual variables] 
( ), ,, , ,
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Taking the dual of the min-max formulation yields the following 
formulation. 
Formulation 5: MAX MP Dual (Minimizing the Maximizing Multiple-Path 
Flow) 
Min-Max optimization of flow 
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This formulation is the dual of the maximizing multiple-path flow 
formulation. The formulation consists of dual variables for flow balance: equation 
(C5.1), arc capacity: equation (C5.2), and demand: equation (C5.3) for each s-t 
pair. Like the single-path model, the attacker desires to minimize the previously 




The following table shows the number of decision variables and 
constraints contained in multiple-path MIP model (dual): 
  
Dual Decision 
Variables   Dual Constraints     
 Node Flow n·e·(e-1) Flow Balance m·e·(e-1)  
 Upper bound m Arc Capacity e·(e-1)  
  Commodity Flow e·(e-1) Demand e·(e-1)   
  
 The multiple-path dual model is a mixed integer program that we also 
solve using GAMS and the CPLEX Solver.  Again, the time GAMS requires to 
solve this problem grows significantly with the number of s-t pairs in the network. 
Working with Proportional Flow 
If a user is disconnected from the network as a result of an attack, flow to 
or from that user is no longer possible. Thus, that user cannot send or receive 
traffic, so ,s tZ =0. Just like in the single-path formulation, flows are constrained to 
be proportional to each other ( , 0s t s tZ D Dρ− = ), so the disconnection of a single 
edge node from the network effectively sets ρ=0 and all flows disappear. In 
practice, the disconnection of a user does not preclude other users from sending 
and/or receiving traffic. In this sense, the proportionality constraint used here is 
unrealistic. In order to facilitate the computation of a more reasonable traffic 
response to an attacked network, we consider the following model re-formulation: 
Let ,s tρ be the proportionality constant for a single s-t pair. We modify the 
equation (C3.4) 
, , 0 ( , )s t s t s tZ D D s t Nρ− = ∀ ∈  
And add an additional constraint 
, , ( , )s t s tR s t Nρ ρ= ∀ ∈   
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Where ,s tR =1 if there exists a path connecting node s to node t, or ,s tR =0  if no 
such path exists. Thus ,s tR is a binary value that indicates whether an individual 
s-t path is available in the network.  
There are two approaches for determining the ,s tR values. The first is to 
let them be binary variables and have the model determine the best choices. 
(This makes the primal problem a MIP.) A drawback with this approach is that 
while the model will never allow , 1s tR =  if s and t are not connected, s-t pairs that 
are connected might also be shut off proactively in order to provide a better 
solution for maximizing flow through the remaining network (again the Braess 
Paradox). Such a solution is contrary to the “fairness” assumption underlying our 
use of proportional flows. 
An alternative approach is to pre-compute the ,s tR values using a 
reachability algorithm (Appendix E). The multiple-path model (Figure 3) remains 
the same, with the addition of the following data. 
Formulation 6: R-MAX MP (Revised Maximizing Multiple-Path Flow) 
Calculated Data  
             ,s tR            Connection between node s and node t [binary]           
                    ,
1 if node is "reachable" from node  
0 if node is not "reachable" from node 
s t t sR
t s
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Discussion 
In summary, MAX MP calculates total flow through the network under 
best-case traffic engineering. MAX MP Dual determines the optimal arc(s) to 
attack in order to reduce flow through the network the most. And finally, R-MAX 
MP calculates total flow on a “damaged” network. Just like for the single-path 
model, this model allows us to study networks in which only the nodes are  
capacitated ( ,i ju = ∞ ), or when just the arcs are capacitated ( kB = ∞ ), or when 
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III.  ANALYZING THE ABILENE NETWORK 
Abilene is the high-speed backbone of the Internet2 educational network, 
a not-for-profit advanced networking consortium of universities, laboratories, and 
government agencies. (Detailed information is available at 
http://www.internet2.edu/) Figure 1 represents Abilene’s network topology (as of 
2004). We use the models developed in the previous chapter to examine how 
different methods of traffic engineering affect the carrying capacity of the 

































































































• The clouds in the figure are customers, either campus networks 
(white) or other network providers (grey).  
• Abilene has a total of 58 customers and/or peers. CENIC, ESnet, 
GEANT, NYSERNet, and Oregon GigaPoP all use Abilene at more 
the one location. We treat each of those connections as multiple 
customers, bringing the total number to 65. 
• There are 4,160 customer-to-customer pairs (e·(e-1)= 65 · 64= 
4160). 
• Each of the eleven circles represents a transshipment node, 
specifically a Juniper T640 Router, located in a major U.S. city.  
• The arcs are undirected with line colors and thickness indicating 
traffic capacity (i.e., bandwidth), which we use as a proxy for 
customer demand for traffic (i.e., the demand for customer s to 
route traffic to customer t is equivalent to the product of their 
bandwidth capacity). 
• There exist fourteen, two-way connections amongst the 
transshipment routers.  
As detailed in the previous chapter, we seek to maximize the  amount of 
traffic carried among the 4,160 customer-to-customer pairs. The MAX SP 
represents the simplest form of traffic engineering in which data is routed 
between customers via the single “shortest” path as seen by IP. The MAX MP 
represents the best-case scenario for traffic engineering, in which data sent from 
customer to customer can be split into multiple streams, each following its own 
path. Sometimes the optimal multiple paths are longer than the shortest path, 
sometimes they are the same. Both formulations raise all 4,160 flows in the 
network in proportion to one another (via the constant of proportionality ρ) until at 
least one of the network components reaches capacity and becomes saturated.  
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A. OPTIMAL FLOWS WITH NODE CAPACITIES 
In practice, both nodes and arcs are capacitated, but here we will focus on 
the throughput capacity of transshipment routers in the network. Here the 
transshipment routers (the nodes) each have a maximum capacity of 320,000 
megabits per second (Mbps), which represents the highest combination of line 
cards supported by the T640 Router at the time the data was collected.  
1. Maximum Flow through Abilene 
The total amount of traffic routed between customers using MAX SP and 
MAX MP is 630,941 Mbps (C1.0) and 738,442 Mbps (C3.0) respectively. Those 
results, along with the transshipment node utilizations are displayed in the table 
below.  
Utilization of an internal node (router) is simply the percentage of that 

























NOTE: The units on the “flow” values in the tables and figures throughout this 
chapter are in Mbps. 
Table 1.   Utilization of Abilene Transshipment Routers Under Maximum 
Flows 
    MAX SP   MAX MP   Increase    
 Total-Flow   630,941 738,442  15%  
  ρ 0.000035  0.000041   15%   
 ATLANTA 0.742 1  26%  
 CHICAGO 0.652 0.940  29%  
 DENVER 0.578 0.887  31%  
 HOUSTON 0.608 0.963  36%  
 INDIANAPOLIS 0.528 0.927  40%  
 KANSAS CITY 0.595 1  41%  
 LOS ANGELES 0.439 0.469  3%  
 NEW YORK 0.901 0.939  4%  
 SEATTLE 0.541 0.633  9%  
 SUNNYVALE 0.335 0.395  6%  
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  WASHINGTON DC 1  1   0%   
The less restrictive MAX MP achieves a 15% increase of flow through the 
network. Also, every transshipment router is utilized more than it is in MAX SP, 
and the increases vary by router.  
























=1) and thus is the “bottleneck.” It is 
preventing a further increase in flow (ρ). In the multiple-path model, the Atlanta 
and Kansas City routers are also saturated.  
Increasing the throughput capacity of the bottleneck router(s) in the 
network would enable an increase in flow through the network. For example, if 
we could double the capacity of Washington D.C. ( Washington DCB =640,000 Mbps, 
perhaps by operating two Juniper T640 routers in parallel) we would increase 
flow 10% (ρ=.000039) for single-path routing. Doing the same to Sunnyvale 
instead produces a 0% flow increase. 
In practice, it may not be feasible, or necessary, to increase the capacity 
of every transshipment router in order to improve total throughput, thus 
identifying the bottleneck(s) is significant.   
The next two figures demonstrate the actual data flows between the 
transshipment routers. The bold italicized number adjacent to the router is the 
sum of the demands of the customers located at that particular router. The 
number in each node is its utilization (expressed as a fraction of its capacity) 
under maximum flow conditions. These numbers correspond to the values in 
Table 1. Not shown is the data flow between customers who use Abilene at the 








































































































































Figure 3.   Abilene Multiple-Path Flow through Nodes 
As expected, the flow levels in MAX SP (Figure 2) are symmetric since the 
shortest paths between the transshipment routers are also symmetric. 
In Figure 3, the flow levels on each arc are no longer symmetric since 
multiple-path model uses all available capacity, even if not on the shortest path. 
The difference in the flow values between the two figures on the 
transshipment connections can be explained by the MAX MP’s ability use longer 
and/or multiple routes for sending traffic between customers. 
The next two figures show the paths for data destined to the New York 
(dashed green arrows) and Sunnyvale (solid blue arrows) routers from the other 
routers in the network (MAX SP: ,,
s t





































Figure 5.   Multiple-Path Flow to New York & Sunnyvale Routers 
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The total amounts of traffic traveling to New York and Sunnyvale are 
shown in Table 2 (MAX SP: ,s t
s
X∑ , MAX MP: ,s t
s
Z∑  where t=New York and 
Sunnyvale). The numbers shown simply reflect the differences in ρ values 
between the single-path and multiple-path solutions. 
Table 2.   Traffic Flow to New York & Sunnyvale Routers 
    Single-Path   Multiple-Path   
  To To  To To  
    NEW YORK SUNNYVALE   NEW YORK SUNNYVALE   
From ATLANTA 7,357 2,271  8,610 2,658  
 CHICAGO 15,438 4,765  18,068 5,577  
 DENVER 2,171 670  2,541 784  
 HOUSTON 2,338 722  2,737 845  
 INDIANAPOLIS 4,850 1,497  5,676 1,752  
 KANSAS CITY 1,671 516  1,956 604  
 LOS ANGELES 13,598 4,197  15,915 4,912  
 NEW YORK ------ 10,201  ------ 11,939  
 SEATTLE 21,677 6,691  25,370 7,831  
 SUNNYVALE 10,201 ------  11,939 ------  
  WASHINGTON DC 35,725 11,027   41,812 12,906   
 
Abilene data reduction 
 
Both the single-path (EXCEL) and multiple-path (GAMS) models take a 
considerable amount of time to the execute Abilene data. 4,160 customer-to-
customer paths translates into a large number of decision variables and 
constraints. An example of this is shown in the table below. 
 
             
 Single-Path (Figure 1)    TOTAL   
 Decision Variables Customer-to-Customer Pairs 4,160 Variables 4,160 
 Constraints Router Capacity 11 Constraints 4,329 
 Arc Capacity 158   
 Flow Proportionality 4,160   
 Multiple-Path (Figure 3)     
 Decision Variables Flow on Return Arcs 4,160 Variables 4,329 
 Flow through Nodes 169   
 Constraints Balance of Flow 361,920 Constraints 366,249 
 Arc Capacity 169    
   Flow Proportionality 4,160        
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We can significantly reduce the number of customer-to-customer paths if 
we only consider paths between the eleven transshipment routers. The demand 
( kB ) at each router can be aggregated from the sum of the demands of that 
router’s customers (same values in Figure 2 and Figure 3). However, this 
reduction does not account for the traffic routed between customers who use the 
same router. So we leave those paths in our data reduction (i.e., for example, 
keep the paths from University of Hawaii to Pacific Northwest GigaPoP and to 
Pacific Wave, but get rid of the paths to sixty-two paths).  
We reduce the number of customer-to-customer paths to 462 (110 router-
to-router paths plus 362 total “local” customer paths). 
 
 Single-Path (Figure 1)    TOTAL   
 Decision Variables Customer-to-Customer Pairs 462 Variables 4,160 
 Constraints Router Capacity 11 Constraints 631 
 Arc Capacity 158   
 Flow Proportionality 462   
 Multiple-Path (Figure 3)     
 Decision Variables Flow on Return Arcs 462 Variables 631 
 Flow through Nodes 169   
 Constraints Balance of Flow 40,194 Constraints 40,825 
 Arc Capacity 169    
   Flow Proportionality 462        
 
This reduction dramatically improves the model run times, from minutes to 
seconds. 
2. Single Node Attack 
Now we consider the impact of losing one of the transshipment routers. 
Causes for a losing a router range from equipment failure to a deliberate attack. 
When a router is lost, its throughput capacity goes to zero ( kB =0) making it 
unavailable to the network. Thus customers connected to that router are no 
longer able to send and receive traffic from the other customers. 
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The top five “optimal” router attacks obtained via enumeration ( here, 
11
1
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
combinations ) for single-path routing are calculated using MIN-MAX SP and 
appear in the table below. Also shown are the percentage changes to total of 
flow between customer-to-customer pairs (C2.0) and flow through the network (ρ) 
after a particular router attack ( kY =1).  
Recall from Chapter II that after attack has occurred, the amount of flow 
through the network (ρ) adjusts to accommodate the “new” capacity and demand 
constraints.  
Table 3.   Top 5 Single-Node Attacks Under Single-Path Routing 
    Router Total Flow    ρ     
 1 INDIANAPOLIS 431,804 -32% 0.000026 -26%  
 2 CHICAGO 438,168 -31% 0.000030 -14%  
 3 ATLANTA 458,729 -27% 0.000028 -20%  
 4 KANSAS CITY 512,749 -19% 0.000029 -17%  
  5 WASHINGTON DC 516,005 -18% 0.000051 31%   
 
 
The top five optimal router attacks to multiple-path routing are obtained by 
solving MAX MP DUAL. The values from equation (C5.0), the minimized 
maximum flow, are shown in the next table.  
Table 4.   Minimized Total Flow 
    Router Minimized Total Flow   
 1 WASHINGTON DC 98,442  
 2 NEW YORK 142,047  
 3 CHICAGO 300,106  
 4 SEATTLE 333,428  
  5 INDIANAPOLIS 391,222   
 
 
We compute attacks 2 through 5 by making the previous router(s) that were 
attacked invulnerable (i.e., for example, , 'WashingtonDC WashingtonDCv =0 allows use to 
determine the second best router attack plan).  
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 After the flow through the network adjusts to accommodate the new 
capacity and demand constraints after a particular router attack ( , 'k kY =1), we use 
R-MAX MP to compute total of flow between customer-to-customer pairs (C6.0) 
and flow through the network (ρ). Those results are shown in the next table. 
Table 5.   Top 5 Single-Node Attacks Under Multiple-Path Routing 
    Router Total Flow   ρ     
 1 INDIANAPOLIS 431,804 -42% 0.000026 -37%  
 2 CHICAGO 438,168 -41% 0.000030 -27%  
 3 ATLANTA 458,729 -38% 0.000028 -32%  
 4 WASHINGTON DC 516,005 -30% 0.000051 19%  
  5 NEW YORK 588,184 -20% 0.000055 25%   
 
After flow through the network is adjusted, Indianapolis becomes the 
worst. Notice, in both models, the changes in total of flow differ from the from the 
changes in flow through the network, as measured by ρ. 
Attacks to Indianapolis, Chicago, and Atlanta are the most devastating. 
The loss of those routers reduces (but not eliminates, see figure 13) the 
network’s “path diversity” such that the R-MAX MP now only uses single paths 
when routing traffic.  
Notice in the tables above that after a loss of the Washington D.C. router 
in MIN-MAX SP, and a loss of the Washington D.C. and New York routers in R-
MAX MP, flow through the remaining network actually increases. This is again an 
example of Braess’s paradox (discussed in Chapter II). By removing the large 
demand associated with Washington D.C. customers, Washington DCD =0 instead of 
33,217 Mbps, and it becomes possible to raise flow in the network from 
.000035(single-path) and .000041(multiple-path) to .000051. 
The next table that shows the benefits of R-MAX MP over MIN-MAX SP in 
terms of total flow in the presence of a router attack. 
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Table 6.   Single-Path vs. Multiple-Path Flow Following a Router Attack 
    Single-Path Multiple-Path Multiple-Path Increase   
  Pre-Attack Flows: 630,941 738,442 15% 
 Post-Attack Flows    
 Router Loss:    
 ATLANTA 458,729 458,729 0% 
 CHICAGO 438,168 438,168 0% 
 DENVER 516,354 642,818 20% 
 HOUSTON 606,461 619,689 2% 
 INDIANAPOLIS 431,804 431,804 0% 
 KANSAS CITY 512,749 592,952 14% 
 LOS ANGELES 629,785 679,827 7% 
 NEW YORK 536,860 588,184 9% 
 SEATTLE 536,483 649,799 17% 
 SUNNYVALE 583,707 691,886 16% 
  WASHINGTON DC 516,005 516,005 0% 
 
From the previous example, the next two figures show how data flowing to 
New York and Sunnyvale is re-routed following the Indianapolis attack. 
 

























Figure 6.   Single-Path Flow to New York & Sunnyvale after Indianapolis Attack 
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Figure 7.   Multiple-Path Flow to New York & Sunnyvale after Indianapolis Attack 
 
We observe that R-MAX MP still uses multiple routes when sending traffic 
to Sunnyvale. However the total flow calculation (C2.0=C6.0=431,804 Mbps) in 
both models remains the same.  
The total amount of traffic traveling to New York and Sunnyvale following 
the Indianapolis attack is also the same in both models, shown in the table 
below. By comparing the values to values in Table 2, we observe 27% flow 








Table 7.   Traffic Flow to New York & Sunnyvale Routers after Indianapolis 
Attack 
    Single-Path & Multiple-Path   
  To   
    NEW YORK SUNNYVALE   
From ATLANTA 5,398 1,666  
 CHICAGO 11,328 3,497  
 DENVER 1,593 492  
 HOUSTON 1,716 530  
 INDIANAPOLIS ------ ------  
 KANSAS CITY 1,226 379  
 LOS ANGELES 9,978 3,080  
 NEW YORK ------ 7,486  
 SEATTLE 15,906 4,910  
 SUNNYVALE 7,486 ------  
  WASHINGTON DC 26,215 8,092   
 
The Washington D.C. transshipment router is the bottleneck in both 
models. 
3. Multiple Node Attacks 
Here we extend the previous analysis to the case where the number of 
router attacks is greater than one (attacks>1). 
According to MAX MP DUAL, any node attack that splits that network into 
more than one piece produces an objective value of zero (i.e., 
(C5.0)= , ,i j i ju β∑ =0).  Thus, a solution formulation is uninformative because we 
are unable to observe flow through the remaining network (ρ). As a result, we 
compute attacks to the multiple-path network using the R-MAX MP, and we 
determine which the optimal attacks by total enumeration (just as we do for MIN-
MAX MP). 
An inspection of figure 1 might lead one to suspect that the optimal two-
router attack would split the network in half (i.e., Atlanta and Indianapolis, Kansas 
City and Houston, etc), or that the optimal two attacks would include Indianapolis, 
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the optimal one-router attack. However, the optimal two-router attack (out of 
11
2
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
combinations) for both models is Chicago and Seattle. 
The resulting network from the Chicago and Seattle attack consists of nine 
routers and ten arcs. Thus, the only routes that exist between the transshipment 
routers are the single shortest paths. 
The optimal three-router attack (out of 
11
3
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  combinations ) for both 
models is Chicago, Seattle and Los Angeles. 
The next table below shows the total amount of traffic routed between 
customers, (C2.0) and (C6.0), the flow through the network (ρ), and the 























) in the event 
of one, two, and three attacks. 
Table 8.   Optimal Router Attacks 
  Single-Path Multiple-Path Both Models  
  number of Attacks 0 0 1 2 3   
 Total-Flow   630,941 738,442 431,804 404,454 389,298  
  ρ 0.000035 0.000041 0.000026 0.00004 0.000051   
  Router Utilization  
 ATLANTA 0.742 1 0.745 0.710 0.590 
 CHICAGO 0.652 0.940 0.282 0 0 
 DENVER 0.578 0.887 0.333 0.066 0.295 
 HOUSTON 0.608 0.963 0.676 0.534 0.354 
 INDIANAPOLIS 0.528 0.927 0 0.114 0.125 
 KANSAS CITY 0.595 1 0.344 0.903 0.326 
 LOS ANGELES 0.439 0.469 0.382 0.470 0 
 NEW YORK 0.901 0.939 0.765 0.651 0.294 
 SEATTLE 0.541 0.633 0.382 0 0 
 SUNNYVALE 0.335 0.395 0.239 0.239 0.254 
  WASHINGTON DC 1 1 1 1 1  
 
1 router attack: There is a 32% decrease (i.e., from (C1.0)=630,941 to 
(C2.0)=431,804 Mbps) and 42% decrease in total amount of traffic routed 
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between customers, and 26% and 37% decrease in flow through the network in 
the single-path and multiple-path models, respectively. 
1 router attack vs. 2 router attack: In both models, the total amount of 
traffic routed between customers deceases 6%, while flow through the network 
increases 35% (Braess’s paradox). 
2 router attack vs. 3 router attack: In both models, the total amount of 
traffic routed between customers deceases 4%. Here flow through the network 
increases 22% (again, Braess’s paradox). 
The Washington D.C. transshipment router is the bottleneck in both 
models in all three attacks. Thus, the optimal attacks in all cases do not include 
the bottleneck. Rather, the attacks seem to redirect flow toward the bottleneck. 
The bottlenecks restrict flow through the network and thus the attacker does not 
want to eliminate that restriction.  
B. FLOW ON CAPACITATED ARCS 
In this section of the analysis, we remove the capacity constraint on the 
transshipment routers ( kB =∞ ). Now only the fourteen arcs are capacitated. In 
reality, the connections are single “duplex” connections, meaning that they 
support traffic flowing in both directions. Here, we treat each connection as a pair 
of directed arcs (i.e., Atlanta-to-Houston and Houston-to-Atlanta as different 
connections), each with a speed of 10 gigabits per second (Gbps) ( ,i ju =10,000 




1. Maximum Flow through Abilene 
The tables below show the utilization of twenty-eight transshipment node 
























) models, as 
well as the total amount of flow between customer-to-customer pairs, (C2.0) and 
(C6.0), and flow through the network (ρ). 
Table 9.   Utilization of Abilene Arcs Under Maximum Flows 
           
  Single-Path Multiple-Path Multiple-Path Increase  
 Total-Flow   67,802 76,467 11% 
  ρ 0.0000038 0.0000042 10%  
 ATL-HOUSTON 1 1 0%  
 ATL-INDY 0.210 0.805 74%  
 ATL-DC 0.992 1 1%  
 CHICAGO-INDY 0.757 0.972 22%  
 CHICAGO-NY 0.781 1 22%  
 DNVR-KC 0.961 1 4%  
 DNVR-SEATTLE 0.723 1 28%  
 DNVR-SUNNY 0.199 0.766 74%  
 HOUSTON-ATL 1 0.972 -3%  
 HOUSTON-KC 0.384 0.962 60%  
 HOUSTON-LA 0.595 0.987 40%  
 INDY-ATL 0.210 0.834 75%  
 INDY-CHICAGO 0.757 0.972 22%  
 INDY-KC 0.620 0.827 25%  
 KC-DNVR 0.961 1 4%  
 KC-HOUSTON 0.384 0.934 59%  
 KC-INDY 0.620 0.855 27%  
 LA-HOUSTON 0.595 0.987 40%  
 LA-SUNNY 0.301 0.461 35%  
 NY-CHICAGO 0.781 1 22%  
 NY-DC 0.814 0.862 6%  
 SEATTLE-DNVR 0.723 0.924 22%  
 SEATTLE-SUNNY 0.168 0.081 -52%  
 SUNNY-DNVR 0.199 0.843 76%  
 SUNNY-LA 0.301 0.461 35%  
 SUNNY-SEATTLE 0.168 0.005 -97%  
 DC-ATL 0.992 1 1%  
  DC-NY 0.814 0.862 6%   
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The next table compares flow through the capacitated-arc network to flow 
through the capacitated-router network. 
Table 10.   Arc Capacity vs. Router Capacity 
        
  Single-Path 
Capacity Arcs Routers Decrease 
ρ 0.0000038 0.000035 89% 
  Multiple-Path 
Capacity Arcs Routers Decrease 
ρ 0.0000042 0.000041 90% 
 
The difference in network flow between the capacitated-arc and 
capacitated-router networks is over 89% for both the MAX SP and MAX MP. 
Thus arcs are the “severe” constraints on these max flow problems.  
Flow levels for the arcs for MAX SP are symmetric, as expected. 
There is a 11% increase in total amount of flow between customer-to-
customer pairs for MAX MP, and a 10%  increase in flow through the network 
again illustrating the limitations of the single-path traffic routing. 
There are only three out of twenty-four instances where an arc is utilized 
more in the MAX SP than it is in MAX MP: Houston-Atlanta, Seattle-Sunnyvale, 
and Sunnyvale-Seattle. 
The bottlenecks in MAX SP are the Atlanta-Houston and Houston-Atlanta 
arcs. 
There are eight bottlenecks in MAX MP. They are the Atlanta-Houston, 
Chicago-New York, Denver-Kansas City, Denver-Seattle, Kansas City-Denver, 
New York-Chicago, Washington D.C.-Atlanta arcs.  
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2. Single Arc Attack 
We examine the impact that losing one of the arcs ( , 1i jY = ) has on the 
total amount of flow between customer-to-customer pairs in both models. 
Remember, destroying arc (i, j) also destroys arc (j, i) ( , ,=i j j iY Y ). 
Table 11.   Single-Path vs. Multiple-Path Flow Following an Arc Attack 
              
  Single-Path Multiple-Path  
  Connection Lost Total Flow Net Chg Total Flow Net Chg   
 ATL-HOUSTON 41,866 -38% 41,866 -45% 
 ATL-INDY 69,701 3% 76,142 -0.4% 
 ATL-DC 38,234 -44% 38,234 -50% 
 CHICAGO-INDY 38,773 -43% 38,773 -49% 
 CHICAGO-NY 38,234 -44% 38,234 -50% 
 DNVR-KC 42,629 -37% 43,577 -43% 
 DNVR-SEATTLE 67,802 0% 76,104 -0.5% 
 DNVR-SUNNY 57,610 -15% 76,467 0% 
 HOUSTON-KC 68,338 1% 76,467 0% 
 HOUSTON-LA 43,577 -36% 43,577 -43% 
 INDY-KC 41,866 -38% 41,866 -45% 
 LA-SUNNY 53,707 -21% 53,707 -30% 
 NY-DC 43,183 -36% 43,183 -44% 
  SEATTLE-SUNNY 67,802 0% 76,104 -0.5%  
 
The optimal attack plan for both models is to attack either the arcs 
between Atlanta and Washington D.C., or between  Chicago and New York. 
For MIN-MAX SP, eliminating Atlanta-Indianapolis or Houston-Kansas City 
slightly increases total flow through the network by 3% and 1% respectively 
(Braess’s paradox).  
For R-MAX MP, losing either the Atlanta-Indianapolis arcs (decrease < 
.4%), Denver-Seattle arcs (decrease < .5%), Denver-Sunnyvale arcs, Houston-
Kansas City arcs, or Seattle-Sunnyvale arcs (decrease < .5%) do not have a 
noticeable impact on total flow through the network. Thus, R-MAX MP is more 
robust to attacks. 
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C. FLOW ON CAPACITATED NODES AND ARCS 
Now we look at Abilene when both the transshipment routers and their 
twenty-eight arcs are capacitated.  
The routers again have a throughput capacity of 320,000 Mbps. Arc 
speeds of 10 Gbps produce the same results listed in tables 8 and 9 which 
implies that the arc capacities are the “real” constraints in the network. Among 
the eleven transshipment routers, Washington D.C. is utilized the most in both 
the single-path and multiple-path models with a utilization level of .107 and .115 
respectively. To determine the number of arcs in parallel (or bandwidth increase) 
required to saturate a transshipment router, we uniformly increase the arc 
capacities until one of the routers saturates.  
The results are displayed in the next two figures. The connection speeds 



















































































































































Figure 9.   Multiple-Path Utilization vs. Connection Speed 
 
In both models, we can increase arc capacity to 100 Gbps before we 
saturate a transshipment router. Thus the connection speed required to saturate 
a router is between 80 and 100 Gbps. Washington D.C. is the router that is 
saturated in both the single-path and multiple-path models.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We applied the two models representing naive traffic engineering (single-
path routing) and best-case traffic engineering (multiple-path routing) to analyze 
the maximum throughput of Abilene. We performed our analysis with node and/or 
arc capacities. We found that Abilene is well-provisioned in the sense that it 
tends to be the arcs, in particular the customer connections, that saturate data 
flow in the network, a generalization that is consistent with our results.  
For both the single-path and multiple-path optimal solutions, the 
Washington D.C. transshipment router is the bottleneck. Increasing the line  
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speeds of its connections would consequently increase the total amount of flow 








Z∑ ) and 
flow through the network (ρ). 
Our interdiction analysis shows that the optimal transshipment router 
attack is to remove Indianapolis. The second worst single router attack is 
Chicago, which is involved in both the optimal two-router (Chicago, Seattle) and 
three-router (Chicago, Los Angeles, Seattle) attacks. The optimal single arc 
attack is either the Atlanta-Washington D.C. or Chicago-New York arc. These 
results suggest the importance of the Indianapolis and Chicago routers to 
Abilene. Perhaps this is where redundancy should be built into the network. 
We conclude that Abilene is “over provisioned” in terms of its routers and 
can handle increasing connection speeds (i.e., multiple connections in parallel). 
Line speeds of 40 Gbps (OC-768) could be implemented without needing to 
upgrade the routers. 
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The models and analysis in this thesis are applicable to any ISP network. 
The general public, businesses, civilian and military organizations rely heavily on 
these networks. As the reliance grows, so will the need for understanding an 
ISP’s limitations and vulnerability to attacks. 
The interdiction models used in this thesis MIN-MAX SP and MAX MP 
Dual, identify the attack plan that reduces the maximum amount of traffic carried 
among users in the worst possible way. One could take our analysis a step 
further by conducting defender-attacker-defender analysis where the defender 
(network operator) first decides which network components to protect, and study 
how those decisions effect the attacker’s plan (Brown et al. 2006). 
Future work will need to study alternatives to the gravity model because of 
the difficulties that arise when using it. For any multi-commodity gravity model 
network, flow through the network goes to zero if a single node cannot meet its 
demand. So interdicting a  multi-commodity gravity model network is simple, just 
“disconnect” any node from the network. We avoid this in the single-path model 
by solving for the ρ for each node k algebraically where kB >0. Our revised 
multiple-path formulation (figure 6) allows us to get around that for the multiple-
path models. However, as demonstrated in Chapter III, there are often cases 
where Braess’s paradox occurs. It is unsettling that flow through the network 
could rise after an attack.  
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APPENDIX A: FLOYD-WARSHALL ALGORITHM 
The Floyd-Warshall algorithm computes the shortest path between each 
pair of nodes in a network (R. Ahuja et al. 1993). The algorithm builds an n × n 
matrix of shortest path distances, d(i, j),  for each node pair, as well as an n × n 
matrix of predecessor nodes, pred(i, j), for each node in a particular path. If no 
path exists, the distance is reported as ∞ , and the predecessor is null. Floyd-
Warshall runs in O(n3)operations. 
 
algorithm Floyd-Warshall;  
begin 
for all node pairs (i, j) ∈ N x N do 
  d(i, j): = ∞  and pred(i, j): = 0; 
     for all nodes i ∈ N do d(i, i): = 0; 
 for each arc(i, j) ∈ A do d(i, j): = nC and pred(i, j): = i; 
 for each node k: 1 to n do 
  for each (i, j) ∈ N x N do 
  if d(i, j) > d(i, k) + d(k, j) then 
  begin 
   d(i, j): = d(i, k) + d(k, j); 
       pred(i, j): = pred(k, j); 
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APPENDIX B: COMPUTING ,ks tR  
The following is the algorithm builds a matrix (e(e-1) rows × n columns) of 
,
k
s tr  values (binary) for use in the single-path formulations. It uses as input the 





s tr  ; 
begin 
for all (s, t) ∈ E x E do 
 for all k ∈ N do  
,
k
s tR =0; 
end; 
begin 
for s ∈ {1, 2,…, E} do 
  for t ∈ {1, 2,…, E} do 




s tr  = 1; 
  k = pred(s, k); 












APPENDIX C: COMPUTING ,,s ti jq  




i jq  values (binary) for use in the single-path formulations. The algorithm uses as 
input the pred(i, j) matrix obtained from Floyd-Warshall. The  algorithm runs in 




i jq  ; 
begin 
for all (s, t) ∈ E x E do 
 for each arc (i, j) ∈ A do 
  ,,
s t
i jq =0; 
end; 
begin   
k = t; 
do { 
if pred(s, k) = j then; 
  if pred(s, j) = i then; 
   ,,
s t
i jq  = 1; 
   k = pred(s, i); 
} while (k ≠ s) 
end; 
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APPENDIX D: STANDARD LP MAX FLOW 
The standard LP maximum flow formulation adds a unbounded return arc, 
arc (t, s), to a network and then maximums flow on that arc. The rest of the 
formulation consist of balance of flow and arc capacity constraints. 
 
Index Use  
 ,i j N∈   Nodes  
( , )i j A∈   Directed arc from node i to node j 
,s t        Source and terminal nodes  
Data 
,i ju    Upper bound on flow from node i to node j   
                                  on arc (i, j) ∈ A [flow] 
Decision Variables 
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APPENDIX E: REACHABILITY FORMULATION / ALGORITHM 
We determine if source node s is able to reach terminal node t after an 
attack has occurred for all s-t pairs in the network. Since we solve the multiple-
path formulations in GAMS, we also use GAMS to determine node reachabilty by 
solving another LP formulation (as opposed to a standard reachability algorithm 
which GAMS would execute very slowly).  
Index Use  
 , ,i j k N∈   Nodes  
( , )i j A∈   Directed arc from node i to node j 
,s t E N∈ ⊆       Source and terminal nodes in the set of “edge”                    
                                 nodes E  
Data 
 *,i jY    Binary indicator whether the attacker destroyed  
                                           of arc (i, j) ∈ A   
    *,
1 if ( , ) wasdestroyed
0 otherwisei j
arc i j
Y ⎧=⎨⎩  
Decision Variable 
,s tW     Flow from node s to node t [Flow] 
,
s

















. . 0 ,






i j j i
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By maximizing ,s tW  for all s and t, we simultaneously determine whether 
we can send flow from s to t along the “surviving” arcs in the network ( ,
s
i jQ ). The 
dual of the multiple-path maximum flow model (figure 5) determines the *,i jY  
values. *,i jY =1 implies arc (i, j) is attacked and thus has zero capacity for flow, and 
*
,i jY =0 implies arc (i, j)  survived the attack.  
Once we have established which nodes t are reachable from which nodes 
s (i.e., if a path from s to t exist), we are able to compute the ,s tR  values used in 
the revised multiple-path max flow model (figure 6) with a simple algorithm. 
algorithm Compute ,s tR  ; 
begin 
for all (s, t) ∈ E do 
 if *,s tW >0 then; 
  ,s tR =1; 
 else ,s tR =0; 
end; 
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